We prove NP-completeness of deciding the existence of an economic equilibrium in so-called house allocation markets. House allocation markets are markets with indivisible goods in which every agent holds exactly one copy of some good.
Introduction

Markets with divisible goods
A celebrated result by Arrow and Debreu [1] establishes the existence of price equilibria for markets with divisible goods: A market consists of n agents A 1 , . . . , A n and of m continuously divisible goods G 1 , . . . , G m . In the initial allocation, agent A i is endowed with e i,j 0 units of good G j (where 1 i n and 1 j m); the vector e i = (e i,1 , . . . , e i,m ) is called the endowment vector for agent A i . Moreover, every agent A i has a concave utility function u i : R m → R; the value u i (x) measures the degree of desirability of the bundle x for agent A i . The Arrow-Debreu theorem [1] states that for every market of the described form, there exists a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) and allocation vectors x i = (x i,1 , . . . , x i,m ) for all agents A i (i = 1, . . ., n) with the following properties.
(i) All prices p j are positive real numbers. All allocations x i,j are non-negative real numbers. (ii) For every agent A i , the optimization problem "maximize the utility function u i (x) subject to the constraint p · x p · e i " is solved by the
Let us briefly discuss these conditions: Condition (i) is a technical condition on prices and allocations. Next, suppose that every agent A i sells all his initial goods under the price vector p; this provides him with p · e i units of money. Condition (ii) states that the allocation vector x i is the optimal reinvestment of this money p · e i according to the utility function u i of agent A i . Condition (iii) states that when all agents sell and reinvest, then the market will clear exactly. As an immediate consequence of conditions (ii) and (iii), every agent must reinvest all his money:
holds.
Such a price mechanism is said to constitute an economic equilibrium for the market. Arrow and Debreu [1] prove the existence of such an equilibrium via Kakutani's fixpoint theorem. It is an outstanding open problem, whether such an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Markets with indivisible goods
In a market with indivisible goods, the goods are discrete and only available in integer amounts. Consequently, all the endowment vectors e i and all the allocation vectors x i in the above formulation now become integer vectors. It is well known in Mathematical Economics that such markets with indivisible goods do not necessarily possess an economic equilibrium: Example 1. Consider a market with n = 3 agents A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and m = 2 indivisible goods G 1 and G 2 . In the initial allocation, agents A 1 and A 2 each hold one copy of good G 1 , whereas agent A 3 holds one copy of good G 2 . Agents A 1 and A 2 only want G 2 (for them good G 1 has utility zero), and agent A 3 only desires good G 1 (for him good G 2 has utility zero).
Consider a price mechanism that assigns prices p 1 and p 2 to goods G 1 and G 2 , respectively. If p 1 p 2 , then agents A 1 and A 2 both could afford a copy of good G 2 , whereas there is only one such copy available. If p 1 < p 2 , then agents A 1 and A 2 cannot afford a copy of G 2 and must stay with their initial endowment G 1 . However, agent A 3 could also afford a copy of G 1 , and there would be no demand for G 2 . In either case the market will not clear, and so this market does not possess an economic equilibrium.
In their seminal paper [2] Deng, Papadimitriou and Safra have proved that it is NP-complete to decide whether a given market with indivisible goods has an economic equilibrium, even if the utility functions of all agents are linear functions. The argument in [2] constructs markets in which every agent may own an arbitrarily high number of objects.
House allocation markets
In a house allocation market, every agent starts and ends by holding a single indivisible object (a house, for instance). House allocation markets were first introduced and investigated in 1974 by Shapley and Scarf [7] , and in 1977 by Roth and Postlewaite [6] . It may be argued that house allocation markets form the most simple and the most primitive family of nontrivial markets. There is a huge number of papers in Mathematical Economics that study house allocation markets; see for instance Takamiya [8] and Ehlers, Klaus and Pápai [3] for some recent contributions.
In house allocation markets, the possible utility functions are particularly easy to describe: Since every agent always owns exactly one object, his utility function only needs to specify his personal linear ranking of all objects. Note that this ranking may have tied objects; it is a complete, reflexive, transitive (but not necessarily anti-symmetric!) relation. If there are n agents that hold n pairwise distinct houses, then let every agent point to the agent who owns his first-ranked house; ties are broken arbitrarily. The underlying directed graph has n vertices (= agents) and n arcs (= pointing hands), and hence it contains a directed cycle C. Assign the same price of n to all the houses on this cycle C, and assign to every agent on this cycle C his favorite house. Then remove these agents together with their alloted houses, and repeat the whole process for the remaining n < n agents and n houses. Clearly, this procedure yields an economic equilibrium for this type of market.
The market in Example 1 is a house allocation market with duplicate houses that does not possess an economic equilibrium.
Contribution of this paper
We show that it is NP-complete to decide whether a given house allocation market (with duplicate houses) has an economic equilibrium.
The result
Our NP-completeness argument is done via a reduction from the following variant of the NP-complete HITTING SET problem; see Garey and Johnson [4] .
Problem: HITTING SET
Instance: A set Q; a set T of three-element subsets over Q. Question: Does there exist a subset S ⊆ Q that has exactly one element in common with every triple t ∈ T ?
From a given instance of HITTING SET, we construct a house allocation market with n = 4|T | agents and m = 3|Q| + |T | goods. For every element q ∈ Q, there are three corresponding goods G + (q), G − (q), and G 0 (q). For every triple t ∈ T , there is one corresponding good G * (t). There are four types of agents. Proof. Consider some economic equilibrium for the constructed house allocation market. Note first that by condition (iv) (as stated in the Introduction), in this equilibrium every agent must sell his item for some price and buy an item at the same price. For every element q ∈ Q, we denote the prices of the three corresponding goods
, respectively. For every t ∈ T , we denote the price of G * (t) by p * (t). Now consider some fixed element q that occurs in exactly d of the triples in T . Note that for each of the goods G + (q), G − (q), G 0 (q), there are exactly d copies available, that initially are held by corresponding agents of types (A + ), (A − ), and (A 0 ). We distinguish three cases on the prices p − (q) and p 0 (q).
• In the first case, we assume that p 0 (q) < p − (q) holds. Then the d agents of type (A − ) sell their copies of G − (q) and buy copies of G 0 (q) instead. Since this leaves them with p − (q) − p 0 (q) > 0 units of money, we have a contradiction to condition (iv) from the Introduction.
• In the second case, we assume that p 0 (q) = p − (q) holds. Then all the d corresponding agents of type (A − ) sell their copies of G − (q), get a copy of G 0 (q) instead, and end up satisfied and with an empty account. Moreover, there are d corresponding agents of type (A + ) who own G + (q), and who desire to get a copy of G 0 (q). Since all these copies have already been assigned to agents of type (A − ), the equilibrium prices p 0 (q) must be too expensive for agents of type (A + ). Summarizing, this yields Finally, let us define a set S ⊆ Q that contains an element q ∈ Q if and only if the prices p + (q), p − (q), p 0 (q) satisfy the inequalities in (1).
Consider an arbitrary t ∈ T , say t = (q x , q y , q z ). In the economic equilibrium, agent A * (t) must end up with one of the three goods G + (q x ), G + (q y ), G + (q z ), since only these goods are acceptable to him. Let us say, A * (t) ends up with G + (q x ). Then the discussion in the second and third case above yields q x ∈ S, q y / ∈ S, and q z / ∈ S. Therefore, |t ∩ S| = 1 holds, and the set S is a hitting set for T . ✷ Proof. Consider a hitting set S ⊂ Q for T . Define the following prices:
• All goods G * (t) with t ∈ T have price 1.
• All goods G 0 (q) with q ∈ Q have price 2.
• If q ∈ S, then G − (q) has price 2 and G + (q) has price 1. If q / ∈ S, then G − (q) has price 1 and G + (q) has price 2.
Moreover, define the following allocation:
• If q ∈ S, then A 0 (q) receives G − (q), and A − (q) receives G 0 (q). Every agent A + (q) receives a good G * (t) (where q ∈ t), and the corresponding triple agent A * (t) receives G + (q).
• If q / ∈ S, then A − (q) receives G − (q). Moreover, every agent A 0 (q) receives G + (q), and every agent A + (q) receives a good G 0 (t).
Since S is a hitting set for T , every agent A * (t) receives exactly one good. It is straightforward to verify that the described prices and allocations satisfy conditions (i)-(iii), and hence constitute an economic equilibrium. ✷ Lemmas 3 and 4 together yield the following theorem.
Theorem 5.
It is NP-complete to decide whether a house allocation market possesses an economic equilibrium.
